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Abstract
Unemployment is usually explained with reference to the equilibrium of
supply and demand in the labour market. This approach rests on specific
behavioral assumptions that are formally expressed as axioms. The standard
set of axioms is replaced in the present paper by a set of structural axioms.
This approach yields the objective determinants of employment. They consist
of effective demand, the actual outcome of price formation, structural stress
as determined by the heterogeneity within the business sector and the income
distribution. Sudden changes of employment are effected by latent relative
switchers that are hard to spot empirically.
JEL E12, E24
Keywords New framework of concepts, Structure-centric, Axiom set, Full
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These savants, as Galileo put it, first decided how the world should
function in accordance with their preconceived principles. . . . He
openly criticized scientist and philosophers who accepted laws which
conformed to their preconceived ideas as to how nature must behave.
Nature did not first make men’s brains, he said, and then arrange the
world so that it would be acceptable to human intellects. (Kline, 1982,
p. 48)
Theory building consists, roughly, of two separate acts. First the overwhelming
complexity of reality is reduced to the almost-nothingness of some tentative elemen-
tary propositions or, as Schumpeter put it, to ‘hypotheses or axioms or postulates or
assumptions or even principles’ (1994, p. 15). Then, from this almost-nothingness
the multitude of phenomena is logically reconstructed with the expectation that
theoretical conclusions shall find their exact counterpart in reality. There is, though,
no guarantee that this iterative best practice works for all subject matters or at all
times. A self-evident hazard is that reality gets lost in the process. Galileo’s critique
refers to the habitual inclination to ignore the tentativeness of the theoretical starting
point and to force preconceived ideas upon reality.
It seems that this has happened not only on occasion in physics but also with
the marginal principle in economics. The production function is a case in point.
Profit maximization works only with decreasing returns. When we assume for the
moment that increasing, proportional and decreasing returns are equally probable
for industrial production then the marginal principle exerts a strong pressure either
to ignore two-thirds of reality or to apply the principle where it is in most cases not
applicable.
Marginalism is a behavioral principle and it is embodied in the axioms of
standard economics. There is nothing wrong with marginalism except that an
assumption about human behavior necessitates one to make a specific assumption
about the production process. This turns the relation between subjectivity and
objectivity upside down. The general thesis of the present paper is that human
behavior does not yield to the axiomatic method, yet the axiomatization of the money
economy’s fundamental structure is feasible. By choosing objective structural
relationships as axioms behavioral hypotheses are not ruled out. On the contrary,
the structural axiom set is open to any behavioral assumption and not restricted to
the standard optimization calculus.
The case for structural axiomatization has been made at length elsewhere
(Kakarot-Handtke, 2011a) thus we can start the analysis of the objective determi-
nants of employment without further methodological preliminaries. In the following
the minimalistic formal frame that constitutes the pure consumption economy is set
up in section 1. Thereby the premature specification of behavioral assumptions is
forestalled. Then, in section 2, profit as the pivotal concept for the analysis of the
market system is derived from the axiom set. In sections 3 to 5 the properties of
the structural employment equation are discussed in detail and the full employment
conditions are established. It is shown that actual employment depends on the
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expenditure ratio and the factor cost ratio. This implies two types of unemployment
that require different responses. The inverse relation between employment and
the profit ratio is derived in section 6. Structural stress is introduced in section
7 by differentiation of the business sector and it is shown how it depends on the
heterogeneity among firms and how this affects employment. Finally the relation
between employment and the income distribution is established in section 8. It
turns out that the economic system as given by the structural axiom set incorporates
several latent relative switchers which effect sudden changes of employment that
at first sight have no discernible ‘cause’. The properties of a latent switcher are
elaborated in section 9. Section 10 concludes.
1 Axioms
The first three structural axioms relate to income, production, and expenditures in
a period of arbitrary length. For the remainder of this inquiry the period length is
conveniently assumed to be the calendar year. Simplicity demands that we have
for the time being one world economy, one firm, and one product (the consistent
differentiation of the axiom set is carried out in Kakarot-Handtke, 2011b).
Total income of the household sector Y is the sum of wage income, i.e. the
product of wage rate W and working hours L, and distributed profit, i.e. the product
of dividend D and the number of shares N.
Y =WL+DN |t (1)
Output of the business sector O is the product of productivity R and working
hours.
O = RL |t (2)
Consumption expenditures C of the household sector is the product of price P
and quantity bought X.
C = PX |t (3)
The axioms represent the pure consumption economy, that is, no investment
expenditures, no foreign trade, and no taxes or any other government activity.
2 The overall profit ratio
Profit is the pivotal concept for the analysis of the market system. The business
sector’s financial profit Qfi in period t is defined with (4) as the difference be-
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tween the sales revenues – for the economy as a whole identical with consumption
expenditures C – and costs – here identical with wage income YW1:
Q f i ≡C−YW ≡ PX−WL ⇐ YW ≡WL |t (4)
For the business sector as a whole to make a profit consumption expenditures C
have in the simplest case to be greater than wage income YW. So that profit comes
into existence in the pure consumption economy the household sector must run a
deficit at least in one period2. This in turn makes the inclusion of the financial sector
mandatory. An economic theory that does not include at least one bank that supports
the concomitant credit expansion cannot capture the essential features of the market
economy (Kakarot-Handtke, 2011a, p. 11-14).
From (4) and (1) follows for the relation of profit and distributed profit:
Q f i ≡C−Y +YD ⇐ YD ≡ DN |t (5)
Definitions are supplemented by connecting variables on the right-hand side of
the identity sign that have already been introduced by the axioms. To the definitions
in (4) and (5) three structural ratios are added now. With (6) the expenditure ratio
rE, the sales ratio rX, and the distributed profit ratio rD is defined:
ρE ≡ CY ρX ≡
X
O
ρD ≡ YDYW |t (6)
From (5), the first axiom (1), and the definitions (6) one gets for total profits
that it depends on the key ratios rE and rD and the absolute amount of income:
Q f i ≡
(
ρE − 11+ρD
)
Y |t (7)
To get rid of all absolute magnitudes the profit ratio rQ is defined with (8) and
this gives a succinct summary of the structural interrelations of the profit ratio, the
expenditure ratio, and the distributed profit ratio for the business sector as a whole:
ρQ ≡ ρE (1+ρD)−1 ⇐ ρQ ≡ Q f iYW |t (8)
The overall profit ratio rQ is positive if the expenditure ratio rE is >1 or the
distributed profit ratio rD is >0, or both. Neither the capital stock, for example, nor
the degree of monopolization on both the product and the labor market plays any
1 Profits from changes in the value of financial and non-financial assets are excluded here to streamline
the analysis. One member of the latter class is the stock of products which may change with regard to
quantity and valuation price if the product market is not cleared in successive periods. This case is
provisionally ruled out by applying the condition X=O.
2 It needs hardly emphasis that in the investment economy the process of profit generation appears
more complex. This does not affect the essence of profit but simply removes the formal necessity that
the households have to incur a deficit to get the economy going. This is then done by the investing
business sector. It is not advisable, though, to tackle the complexities of the investment economy
before the pure consumption economy is fully understood.
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role. And if the wage rate, which is a component of the distributed profit ratio rD,
and the dividend always move in lockstep, then neither of them affects the overall
profit ratio of the economy under consideration3.
3 Employment
The first relation that is derived from the axioms and definitions is the structural
employment equation:
L =
YD
PR
ρX
ρE
−W
|t (9)
In this form the axioms now imply the additional assumption that employment
as dependent variable is determined by the rest of the system. This is an assumption
about the direction of dependency in a system with complex and mutual interrela-
tions and this add-on assumption is no constituent of the axiom set which is clearly
open to various dependency interpretations. Dependency is conceptually different
from causality (see section 9).
The employment equation states − with the other variables unaltered in each
case:
(i) An increase of the wage rate leads to higher employment, i.e. to a
lower unemployment rate.
(ii) A price increase is conductive to lower employment.
(iii) Provided that wage rate, price and distributed profit all change with the
same rate there is no effect on employment.
(iv) If the configuration of price and wage rate changes is such that the
denominator remains unchanged then employment stays where it is, no
matter how large wage rate and price changes are. In this case perfect
wage–price flexibility has no impact on employment.
(v) An increase of the expenditure ratio rE leads to higher employment.
An expenditure ratio rE>1 presupposes the existence of at least one
bank.
(vi) A productivity increase leads to lower employment.
(vii) As the difference in the denominator approaches zero employment
goes (formally) off to infinity. This singularity is an implicit prop-
erty of the economy as given by the structural axiom set. When this
3 For the full implications of the profit definition for profit theory see (Kakarot-Handtke, 2011a, pp.
16-17)
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Figure 1: Employment Surface Above the Wage Rate–Price Plane (approximated by columns)
point of discontinuity is approached the system’s behavior changes in
unpredictable ways (see section 9).
Statements (i) to (vii) follow without regress to any behavioral assumptions from
the axiom set and the ‘laws of algebra’ (Shaik, 1980, p. 83). Employment moves
around on the employment surface that is depicted in Figure 1 when all variables
except wage rate and price are kept constant. If the axioms capture reality the logical
implications are observable. Equation (9) is the structural axiomatic version of the
Phillips curve and contains the original (Phillips, 1958) as special case.
With regard to the process of adaptation of employment to changes of the
independent variables (9) implies that the independent variables have to be fixed at
the beginning of the period under consideration. Since the period length is arbitrary
no great distortions arise from this idealization if the length is conveniently chosen.
4 Full employment conditions
The standard key variable for the establishment of full employment is the real wage
W/P which has to fall. There is a conspicuous unanimity among economists of all
shades on this point (Prychitko, 1998, p. 2).
The structural axiomatic approach asserts that in the consumption economy
employment is determined by the expenditure ratio rE and the factor cost ratio rF of
which the real wage is a constituent. This follows from (9) under the conditions that
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Figure 2: Structural Relationship between Factor Cost Ratio and Employment
the product market is cleared, i.e. rX=1, and that the relation of dividend to wage
rate rV is held constant. After the addition of the two definitions:
ρF ≡ WPR ρV ≡
D
W
(10)
the employment equation reduces to its simplest form:
L =
DN
PR
ρX
ρE
− W
PR
=
ρV N
ρX
ρE ρF
−1
=
(·)
1
ρE ρF
−1
if ρX = 1 |t (11)
According to (11) employment depends in the pure consumption economy on
rE, i.e. the structural axiomatic expression of Keynes’s effective demand (Keynes,
1973, pp. 23-24), and the outcome of the market price formation rF.
Under the conditions that the product market is cleared, i.e. rX=1, and the
household sector’s budget is balanced, i.e. rE=1, a higher factor cost ratio rF means
higher employment as shown in Figure 2. The curve entails that there is no such
thing as a natural rate of unemployment or some kind of unemployment equilibrium.
Any level of employment can be realized in principle, that is, when the fullness
of microeconomic coordination problems like qualitative or local mismatches is
excluded for the moment.
There exists a unique factor cost ratio rF*, and by consequence a unique real
wage, that is consistent with full employment (however defined). From (11) follows
that condition (12) must be satisfied:
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ρ∗F =
1
(·)
L∗
+1
if ρX = 1; ρE = 1 |t (12)
The numerical value of L* depends on the actual definition of full employment.
If (12) is satisfied the product and the labor market are cleared and the budget is
balanced. Since this result follows without regress to behavioral hypotheses directly
from the axioms it would be conceptually inappropriate to refer to this configuration
as full employment equilibrium. Equilibrium would in addition require some
behavioral mechanism which guarantees that rF speedily approaches rF*. No such
mechanism is known. Nor does it follow from the axiom set without additional
behavioral assumptions. We refer to the rX=1;rE=1–full employment factor cost
ratio rF* as warranted market price configuration.
In the general case the expenditure ratio rE is different from unity and the
weaker condition for full employment reads:
ρFρE =
1
(·)
L∗
+1
if ρX = 1 |t (13)
Full employment can, at least in the short run, be realized with any combination
of the expenditure ratio and the factor cost ratio that satisfies (13) which in turn
entails both, Keynes’s principle of effective demand and the outcome of the actual
market price formation. Figure 2 shows the basic cases for period t with points E, A,
C situated on the full employment line according to (13).
A rX=1, i.e. market clearing; rE=1, i.e. budget balancing; rF=rF*, i.e.
warranted market price configuration; L=L*, i.e. full employment }
best of all possible economic worlds;
B rX=1; rE<1, i.e. saving; rF=rF*; L<L*, i.e. unemployment }
Keynes’s case, insufficient nominal demand, no improved market price
coordination required;
C rX=1; rE<1, i.e. saving; rF>rF*, i.e. unwarranted market price con-
figuration; L=L*, i.e. full employment } compensatory market price
configuration, cannot last indefinitely, a nominal demand increase and
an improved market price coordination is required;
D rX=1; rE=1; rF<rF*, i.e. unwarranted market price configuration;
L<L*, i.e. unemployment } unsatisfactory market price coordination,
no additional nominal demand required;
E rX=1; rE>1, i.e. dissaving; rF<rF*, unwarranted market price con-
figuration; L=L*, i.e. full employment } compensatory dissaving,
cannot last indefinitely, nominal demand cuts and improved market
price coordination is required.
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It has to be emphasized that the product market is – by assumption – cleared in all
cases. The buildup and cutback of an inventory of finished products is not of interest
at this point. By consequence there is never a real shortage of demand. Since the
output is always fully absorbed by the household sector due to the condition rX=1
it can be said that Say’s law holds also at B. Hence Keynes’s case is characterized
by insufficient nominal demand. This additional demand is needed to absorb the
additional output at full employment, where Say’s law holds again. It would
obviously not help much to lower the wage rate in Keynes’s case. To the contrary,
this would lower rF, drive the pure consumption economy down the dotted curve,
and increase unemployment. Hence downward-stickiness of the wage rate is not
the problem. If stickiness is a problem at all then it is upward-stickiness. From the
structural axiomatic perspective both, the fuss about Say’s law and about money
illusion, is entirely beside the point.
Cases B to E would be of no further concern if it were possible to prove that the
invisible hand could be relied upon to always speedily move the pure consumption
economy to point A and to make rE=1 and rF=rF*. It is not sufficient, though, to
prove that a state with all desired properties like point A exists.
As a matter of fact we have no a priori reason to expect that point A acts as
some kind of attractor, or more so than the other points. Likewise, we have no
reason to expect that the right kind of ‘market force’ is spontaneously put to action.
There are two different kinds of unemployment, the first depends on rE and the
second on rF, and each demands its own response. Hence, to begin with, all points
in Figure 2 have to be treated equally. There is no such thing as a full employment
equilibrium or, for that matter, a Keynesian unemployment equilibrium. Keynes’s
case is one among others and he rightly insisted that it requires additional nominal
demand. However, since we have to distinguish between two different kinds of
unemployment, Keynes’s prescription is not the proper one to deal with case D for
example. The movement from D to A implicates rF to increase and this can be done
in quite different ways.
5 Relative adjustments
In order to achieve an increase of the factor cost ratio rF a relative change of wage
rate and price is required at any given productivity. Figure 3 shows the possible
ways to move from point D on the line that is defined by rF1 to a new configuration
on the line that is defined by rF*.
At A1 the wage rate is higher and the price remains unchanged. At A2 the wage
rate remains unchanged and the price is lower. Point A3 represents all combinations
of higher wage rate and lower price that lead to the same result. Both, wage rate
and price may also fall, it is only necessary that the price decrease is greater than
the wage rate reduction as at point A4. Mutatis mutantis for wage rate and price
increases at point A5.
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Figure 3: Alternative Wage Rate-Price Adjustments to Achieve an Increase of the Factor Cost Ratio
Hence it does not matter much whether the economy moves through an infla-
tionary or deflationary phase or whether one of the variables is more sticky than
the other. The direction and absolute magnitude of the wage rate or price change
is, with regard to employment, immaterial; what counts is their relative movement
(Leijonhufvud, 2009, p. 750). With a given productivity the real wage must rise on
the route from D to A. This, of course, is against conventional wisdom.
The counter-intuitive property (from the accustomed perspective) of the employ-
ment equation is that a wage rate reduction, which lowers the real wage, coincides
with lower employment. The microeconomic optimization calculus and Marshall’s
pair of demand/supply scissors – designed for the isolated partial market – simply
do not apply to the economy as a whole. The point to emphasize is: since the
structure that is given by the axiom set does not adapt to behavior, behavior has to
adapt to structure. For the economy as a whole the behavioral real-wage/marginal-
productivity condition is inapplicable and has to give way to (12).
If the real wage has to rise to get the pure consumption economy out of an
unemployment situation that is due to a market price configuration rF<rF* how,
then, is profitability affected?
6 The employment–profitability trade-off
In order to establish full employment business has to accept a lower profit ratio. The
relation of the firm’s profit ratio and the factor cost ratio follows from (4), (2) and
definition (10) and is formally equivalent to the overall profit ratio (8):
10
02
4
6
8
0,80 0,85 0,90 0,95 1,00
In
de
x
Factor cost ratio
Employment and Profit Ratio
Employment Profit ratio
Figure 4: Employment and Profit Ratio in Relation to the Factor Cost Ratio
ρQ ≡ 1ρF −1 if ρX = 1 |t (14)
The profit ratio is the inverse of the factor cost ratio. It can be said, then, that
full employment is never prevented by a ‘high’ wage rate W or a ‘high’ real wage
W/P but by a ‘high’ profit ratio rQ. It is the profit ratio that has to fall as long as
there is unemployment of the rF<rF*–type in the pure consumption economy. The
relation between employment and the profit ratio is depicted in Figure 4.
From the firm’s perspective things look different. By deriving (14) from (4)
employment L drops out of the equation. When the direct structural interdependen-
cies are blanked out the profit ratio appears to be independent of employment. The
individual firm cannot directly see the interrelation that is shown in Figure 4. In
explicit form (14) reads:
ρQ ≡ RW
P
−1 |t (15)
According to the firm’s close-up view the profit ratio depends on the configuration
of wage rate, price and productivity; and these magnitudes are given to a small firm
by the market and the state of technology in period t. Taking these variables as
parameters the profit ratio does, according to (15), not depend on the individual
firm’s level of employment. At a higher employment the firm’s absolute profit is
higher but not the profit ratio. Given the market and technology parameters the
individual firm therefore tends to expand employment until it reaches some internal
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capacity limit; because, given the productivity, no profit maximum or profit ratio
maximum exists.
There is no foothold for marginalism. The application of the marginal principle
presupposes the introduction of a well-behaved production function. Methodologi-
cally this amounts to putting the cart before the horse. What makes this approach
definitely unacceptable is that increasing returns are implicitly ruled out. Reality is
molded to fit the analytical tool. Standard theory is arbitrarily confined to a special
case and the claim of generality is therefore vacuous.
In order to reproduce the neoclassical result for the sake of argument we have
to add the following assumptions to (15). Productivity R has to fall with increasing
employment. This happens only if the familiar production function with falling
marginal productivity is a valid approximation of the real world production condi-
tions. In addition, the real wage has to fall faster than productivity. This is achieved
by the assumption that unemployment motivates workers to accept a lower real
wage. Only this combination assures that the profit ratio rises and this in turn is
the behavioral condition that the firm raises employment until the profit maximum
is reached. As we do not intend to force the marginal principle upon reality there
is no rationale for these additional assumptions. Our formal minimalism is in full
accordance with the economic principle applied to theoretical economics itself.
The call for wage cuts to overcome unemployment is ultimately a logical
consequence of assuming a well-behaved production function. It has no factual
justification. The standard recipe therefore rests in equal measure on a distorted
production theory and on a flawed profit theory.
According to (15) an increase of the wage rate lowers the profit ratio and thus
necessitates an employment expansion to realize the same absolute amount of profit.
The general relationship between total profit and the factor cost ratio follows from
(4) in combination with the employment equation (9) and is given by:
Q f i ≡ 1−ρF
1
ρE
−ρF
YD if ρX = 1 |t (16)
If the expenditure ratio rE is unity then the effects of a higher factor cost ratio
(lower profit ratio) are always exactly compensated by a higher employment and
the overall impact on total profit is nil. Profit is invariably equal to distributed
profit. With regard to total profit business, taken as a whole, could in this case
be indifferent between different employment levels. When the relation between
dividend and wage rate rV is kept constant, as in (11), then distributed profits YD
and by consequence profits Qfi rise and fall with the wage rate, i.e. YD= (rV N)W.
The distributed profit ratio, however, is independent of the wage rate and falls with
rising employment:
ρD ≡ YDWL ≡
ρV N
L
|t (17)
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Hence absolute profits on the one hand and the profit ratio on the other may
produce contradictory signals. The firm, then, first of all has to make a choice among
signals before it can determine its course of action. Decision making depends on
the prior decision about the relevant reality. With regard to employment it is more
favorable when the firm acts on absolute profits than on the profit ratio. What is
more: if the variables in (15) are taken parametrically by the firm the profit ratio
simply provides no clue for a decision about the firm’s level of employment because
it is equal on all levels.
In the last instance it is the decreasing ratio of number of shares N to employment
L that makes that the real wage is higher at a higher employment level. From (12)
follows for the real wage:
W
P
=
R
ρV N
L
+1
if ρX = 1; ρE = 1 |t (18)
The real wage depends positively on the productivity and the level of employ-
ment. This result is modified when we add the assumption that the productivity
falls with rising employment. If this effect is substantial the net outcome is of
course that the real wage wage falls with rising employment. In general, though,
this assumption does not hold. In fact, increasing returns are more probable (and
indeed certain if Adam Smith’s fundamental principle holds). It is therefore in any
case advisable to keep the employment and the productivity impact on the real wage
analytically wide apart and to treat them separately.
From the structural axiom set follows without additional behavioral assumptions
that the real wage rises and the profit ratio falls with increasing employment if rX=1,
rE=1 and rV is constant. This relation, however, does not tell anything about the
distribution of output (see Kakarot-Handtke, 2011c, pp. 8-12).
It goes without saying that employment does not move smoothly along the curve
given by rE=1. During the business cycle the economy may move, for example,
from D to E in Figure 2 and then directly from E to B. This implies wide swings
of the profit ratio. Hence the inverse relationship between employment and the
profit ratio that holds for movements along the curve at any given expenditure
ratio is blurred and barely visible to a single firm. The trade-off is a structural fact.
The myopic firm can perceive the deeper economic reality only through Alice’s
Looking-Glass.
7 Structural stress
Since employment is materially affected by the heterogeneity of firms the business
sector is now split up into two firms in order to determine the effects in detail. The
respective profits are derived from (4) as:
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Q f i1 ≡ P1X1−W1L1 |t
Q f i2 ≡ P2X2−W2L2 |t
(19)
It is assumed that the price is equal for both firms; the firms operate in the same
market. From (19) and axiom (2) then follows:
Q f i1 ≡ PR1L1
(
1− W1
PR1
)
ρX1 = 1 |t
Q f i2 ≡ PR2L2
(
1− W2
PR2
)
ρX2 = 1 |t
(20)
Profit is zero for each firm if the factor cost ratio is unity. Here firm2 is appointed
the role of the marginal firm which has an economic disadvantage compared to firm1
and has to make a profit of at least zero in order to be able to stay in the market. The
condition for zero profit in firm2 reads:
W2
PR2
= 1 |t (21)
From (20) then follows for the profit of firm1 under the minimum condition for
firm2:
Qminf i1 ≡
(
ρR
ρW
−1
)
W1L1 with ρR ≡ RR ;ρW ≡
W
W
|t (22)
Under the preliminary conditions rW=1 the profit of the more productive firm1
(22) must be the higher the greater the productivity disparity between the two firms
is. The degree of heterogeneity is expressed by the productivity ratio rR. If profit
for the business sector as a whole is below this minimum profit the structure of
the business sector is bound to change. Hence structural stress is a function of the
profit for the business sector as a whole and the degree of heterogeneity within the
business sector. When profit for the business sector is greater than the structural
minimum profit all firms are making profits. A straightforward gauge of structural
stress is given by:
ζ ≡ Q
min
f i1
Q f i
|t (23)
If x=0 and Qfi1>0 all firms make a profit relative to their size. If x=1 the profit
of the marginal firm is exactly zero, the whole profit accrues in firm1, and with
x>1 structural change sets in. In an economy with two firms of equal size for
example employment drops by 50 percent. When the structural minimum profit is
given then structural stress varies inversely with the development of profits for the
business sector as a whole. Conversely, with any given total profit the stability of
the economy increases with the degree of homogeneity.
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Since productivity differentials are a normal and enduring feature of the econ-
omy profit must be greater than zero in the pure consumption economy and this
entails rE>1 and/or rD>0. Under the condition that the household sector’s budget
is balanced, i.e. rE=1, it must hold that YD ≥ Qminf i1 or else employment drops from
point A in Figure 2 to point F. In this case a nominal demand increase, i.e. rE>1,
is required first to bring profits above the minimum profit. Subsequently structural
stress has to be taken out of the system by the gradual reduction of heterogeneity
between the firms. The straightforward measure is a productivity catching-up of
firm2.
Yet structural stress is also lowered when the wage ratio rW adapts to the
productivity ratio rR according to (22). So, either the wage rate in the marginal
firm falls or it rises in the firm with the higher productivity or a combination of the
two. In the limiting case the ratio of wage rates rW thus becomes equal to the ratio
of productivities rR. Then structural stress x is zero and the distribution of profits
between both firms is proportional to their size. The marginal firm is out of the zone
of immediate danger. To exclude side effects this wage adaptation process should
in the ideal case take place in such a manner that total income remains constant.
This happens if the average wage rate remains constant for the given distribution of
employment between the firms. The required wage rate increase in firm1 for any
wage reduction in firm2 follows from the definition of the average wage rate for
W=constant:
W ≡W1 L1L +W2
L2
L
|t (24)
To lower the wage rate in the marginal firm only makes sense if it is compensated
for by an appropriate increase in firm1 otherwise the average wage rate falls. This
in turn lowers the factor cost ratio and leads according to (11) to a lower overall
employment. A partial wage cut can stabilize the marginal firm but only to the
detriment of overall employment. The advantage of partial wage reductions is that
unemployment can be more evenly spread over the whole economy and a sudden
irreversible collapse of one firm can be avoided. This reduces the risk of a chain
reaction. The marginal firm is indispensable for the perpetuation of the actual
employment level. To keep it in the market without negative employment effects in
the rest of the economy requires a compensatory wage increase in the rest of the
economy.
The relation between the overall factor cost ratio and employment in (11) is
continuous only as long as structural stress z is not greater than unity. Since overall
profits and the minimum profit vary independently a discontinuity may occur at short
notice without a clearly identifiable cause since z depends indirectly on the ratio of
the two ratios rR and rW. When all depends on relative magnitudes the notion of a
definite cause loses its meaning; it cannot be located in one firm or the other but only
in the no man’s land between them. This is the reason why it escapes partial analysis.
It is not a rare event that economic policy proposals are derived from partial analysis
which appeals especially to empiricists and experienced practitioners. The idea that
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a wage cut helps to avoid unemployment is a good one for a single firm and it has
all the empirical evidence on its side a positivist may ask for; ultimately it falls prey
to the fallacy of composition.
8 Distribution
What we finally need to reach point A in Figure 2 is an expenditure ratio rE=1.
In general the expenditure ratio is not identical for spending out of wage income
and spending out of distributed profits. When the recipients of wage income and
distributed profits belong to two separate groups with different spending behavior
the general definition of the expenditure ratio is given as the weighted average of
the groups individual expenditure ratios:
ρE ≡ ρWE
YW
Y
+ρDE
YD
Y
|t (25)
The shares of output that the receivers of wage income and distributed profits
absorb with their respective expenditure ratios is not of interest here; they are
formally derived in (Kakarot-Handtke, 2011c, p. 11). It is usually assumed that
the expenditure ratio for wage income is higher than that for distributed profits.
Let us assume for simplicity that the latter is zero. In this case the condition rE=1
demands:
ρWE =
1
YW
Y
|t (26)
The expenditure ratio of the receivers of wage income must be the higher the
smaller their share of total income is. This is not impossible for a long stretch of
time4 but presupposes that both households and banks are willing to expand credit.
To arrive at a configuration that is not dependent on substantial credit expansion
over a longer time span it would be necessary either that the share of wage income
rises to unity or that the expenditure ratio for distributed profits rises to unity, or
something in between. If neither happens the business sector will find itself on a
curve below the benchmark curve rE=1 in Figure 2.
If the share of wage income is unity and the expenditure ratio ρWE too then
profit is zero. This configuration therefore presupposes that structural stress is
permanently zero which is obviously not feasible because productivity or wage
differentials occur at random. Full employment demands that both the expenditure
ratio for wage income ρWE and that for distributed profits ρDE is unity in the pure
consumption economy and that YD ≥ Qminf i1 . It cannot be maintained in earnest
that there exist ‘market forces’ that speedily realize all these conditions or that the
4 When the purchase of long lived consumption goods, e.g. houses, is correctly subsumed under
consumption expenditures there arises no problem with regard to collateral for the banking industry
and a sound credit expansion may proceed for an indefinite time in the pure consumption economy.
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invisible hand can do the trick. The price mechanism, which is incorporated in rF,
cannot compensate for rE<1 or for YD < Qminf i1 over a longer time span.
What we need, then, for the economy to move in the direction of full employ-
ment are two biases. It is favorable, first, when the expenditure ratio is more often
than not above unity and, second, when there exists a light but continuous wage
push and at the same time a retard on price increases which in combination exert
an upward drive on the factor cost ratio. Hence it is not harmful when competition
in the product market is somewhat more intensive than in the labor market. On the
contrary, as already J. S. Mill recognized, it is ‘a necessary instrumentality of that
free market’ (Mill, 2006, p. 932).
9 Latent relative switchers
Since Ricardo asserted that ‘corn is not high because a rent is paid, but a rent is
paid because corn is high’ (Vickers, 1995, p. 71) the question of causality returned
repeatedly at critical junctures in theoretical economics. Disputes over economic
policy hinge on causal beliefs and this poses the problem that it is difficult, to say the
least, to ascertain empirically whether the causality runs, for example, from money
to prices or, equally debatable, from saving to investment, or just in the opposite
direction (Hoover, 2001). Moreover, the notion of causality itself ‘has been hard
to understand’ (Hausman, 1992, p. 294). Causality, which implies the notion of
force5, is not a constituent of the structural axiomatic approach because ‘deductive
chains of reasoning cannot on their own establish the existence of causal processes
in the real world’ (Hodgson, 2001, p. 76). In the structural axiomatic context we
can speak of directionality but not of causality. By consequence we have to replace
the common sense notion of a cause by the notion of a switcher or, more precisely,
by the notion of a latent relative switcher.
In the foregoing analysis we have met relative switchers on several occasions.
The first makes its appearance in the employment equation. According to (11)
employment is dependent on the expenditure ratio rE and the factor cost ratio rF.
Both ratios vary independently. It is obvious from the equation, however, that,
5 ‘These formulae condense the description of an infinite number of orbits and motions in one single
simple statement: that some property of the motion is the same for the whole class, independent of the
individual case, therefore depending only on the one other thing involved, namely the earth. Hence
this property, namely the vertical acceleration, must be ‘due to the earth’, or ‘caused by the earth’,
or ‘a force exerted by the earth’. This word ‘force’ indicates a specification of the general notion of
cause, namely a measurable cause, expressible in figures’ (Born, 1949, pp. 11-12). A well-known
example of borrowing from physics is Adam Smith’s concept of the natural price as a center of gravity
that is reached through the operation of inexorable market forces. The operation of these ‘forces’ is
not an issue in general equilibrium models and therefore no urgent need was felt to determine market
forces (which have a name and an address) in great detail. Causality, force, law are used in economics
mainly as metaphors to fill the logical gaps in an argument and have not much in common with their
counterparts in physics. Strictly speaking causality does not exist at all in standard economics: ‘In a
general equilibrium model there is no real sense in which one factor causes another: everything is
determined simultaneously by the whole collection of relationships’ (Foley, 2003, p. 500).
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if the configuration rE=1/rF occurs, employment goes formally off to infinity, i.e.
the normal directionality that is established by (11) no longer holds. The system
becomes indeterminate. This event is neither due to some definite value of the
expenditure ratio nor of the factor cost ratio. Both variables may have assumed the
critical values many times before but not in the same period. Hence it is difficult or
even impossible to spot any anomaly by looking at the respective time series. The
event may repeat itself albeit with a quite different configuration of the independent
variables. These are inauspicious preconditions for empirical research.
It is, of course, improbable that the factor cost ratio is exactly inverse to the
expenditure ratio. Systemic instability increases already when the the two ratios
approach each other more than usual. The latent switcher is surrounded by a zone
of danger.
The factor cost ratio is itself a latent relative switcher. According to the em-
ployment equation (11) we will find either a stable relation between the absolute
wage rate and employment in the data over a stretch of time or not. Roughly the
same holds for the relation between the real wage and employment. Seen from the
structural axiomatic perspective both hypotheses are unqualified for a significant
empirical test. A stable correlation cannot appear before the ratio of wage rate,
price and productivity is taken into account and placed in the context of (11). A
switch from employment expansion to contraction then depends on the relative
changes of the three independent variables. Hence imperceptible changes of any
underlying variable may either cancel out and thereby contribute to stability or lead
in combination to a sudden change of direction. The relative switcher is a perfectly
deterministic device but hidden between the time series of its component variables.
All this follows directly from the structural axiom set and there is no need to resort
to catastrophe or chaos theory for explaining economic events that seem to have no
palpable ‘cause’. They have, but it is not of the accustomed kind.
Structural stress, finally, is the most complex switcher so far because it contains
structural and distributional determinants. From (23), (22), (7) and (25) follows
explicitly:
ζ ≡
ρR
ρW
−1
ρWE
YW
Y
+ρDE
YD
Y
− 1
1+ρD
YW1
Y
|t (27)
This switcher determines the point where employment drops from the actual
smooth curve of Figure 2 to a lower one. This drop happens in the limiting case with
unaltered magnitudes at the macro level through relative changes within the business
or the household sector. Equation (27) indicates for example that wholesale demand
management runs the risk of being counteracted by the interplay of structural and
distributional alterations.
As the economy approaches the switch from z<1 to z>1 the marginal firm’s
existence becomes progressively jeopardized. When we start from full employment
the risk of unemployment increases and has to be weighted with the relative size of
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the marginal firm. The firm can influence only the denominator of rR and rW, the
rest hinges on luck or, what almost amounts to the same, on actual macroeconomic
policy.
Since Veblen (1961) and the German Historical School it has repeatedly been
asserted that the notion of an economic ‘law’ or, even more fundamentalistic, that
the axiomatic method is incompatible with the historical specificity of the economic
process (e.g. Hodgson, 2001). This is true for general equilibrium theory, but
this approach cannot, for good methodological reasons, be taken as a benchmark.
What has to be emphasized is that the structural axiom set and the embodied latent
relative switcher is consistent with both the common sense notion of a ‘law’ and
historical specificity. Equation (27) can be taken as the testable structural axiomatic
‘law of default’ that explains, first, why the marginal firm defaults and, second,
why this default is not predictable. The ‘cause’ of the default and the increase
of unemployment is not a single event but an unknown number of latent critical
configurations of which one becomes manifest in historical time. This implies
that we cannot, in the proper sense, learn from economic history because the same
outcome can be produced by an arbitrary number of critical configurations. Story-
telling and Verstehen are a popular pastime yet no substitute for a theory that is
formally based on a set of – structural – axioms.
10 Conclusions
Behavioral assumptions, rational or otherwise, are not solid enough to be eligible
as first principles of theoretical economics. Hence all endeavors to lay the formal
foundation on a new site and at a deeper level actually need no further vindication.
The present paper suggests three non-behavioral axioms as groundwork for the
formal reconstruction of the evolving money economy and applies these to the
theory of employment.
The main results of the structural axiomatic inquiry are:
• The expenditure-income asymmetry is the indispensable prerequisite for
favorable business conditions and prolonged growth. This holds for the
elementary consumption economy and the complex investment economy in
equal measure.
• The key variables for the attainment of full employment are the expenditure
ratio rE, i.e. the structural axiomatic version of Keynes’ effective demand,
and the factor cost ratio rF, i.e. the configuration of wage rate, price, and
productivity as outcome of market price formation.
• There is a structural trade-off between employment and the profit ratio. It is
not a ‘high’ nominal or real wage that prevents full employment but a ‘high’
profit ratio.
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• Structural stress increases with the heterogeneity between firms with regard
to productivity and wage rate, and decreases with overall profits. A value of
the structural stress gauge of z>1 indicates the default of the marginal firm
and a sudden increase of unemployment that depends on the firm’s size. The
switch from z<1 to z>1 is effected by structural and distributional changes
within the business and household sector.
• The economic system as given by the structural axiom set incorporates several
latent relative switchers that assume the role of a ‘cause’. The defining
property of a switcher is that relative changes of two or more independent
variables effect sudden changes of direction of the dependent variable. There
is an unknown number of critical configurations of the independent variables
that lead to the same outcome. One of the multiple latent ‘causes’ becomes
manifest in historical time. Since a switcher is composed of two or more
variables the critical configurations are hardly visible in particular time series
and sudden changes seem to come out of nowhere. In fact they are precisely
defined.
• Employment depends on effective demand and the outcome of price forma-
tion on the one hand and on structural stress which in turn depends on the
heterogeneity of firms and the relation of wage income to distributed profits
on the other.
The level of employment and sudden changes of employment can be derived in direct
lineage from the structural axiom set. ‘Forces’ that move the economy toward full
employment are not invoked as an explanation. The structural axiomatic approach is
consistent with the common sense notion of an economic ‘law’ and with historical
specificity.
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